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 Abstract 
 
The contingent valuation method for estimating willingness to pay for public goods typically 
adopts a single referendum question format which is statistically inefficient. As an alternative, 
Cooper, Hanemann and Signorello (2002) propose the ‘one-and-one-half bound’ (OOHB) 
format allowing researchers to question respondents about both a lower and higher limit upon 
project costs, thereby securing substantial statistical efficiency gains. These bounds are 
presented prior to the elicitation of responses thereby avoiding the negative ‘surprise’ induced 
by an unanticipated second question. However, this approach conflicts with the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite result that only a single referendum format question is incentive compatible. 
The OOHB method may therefore be liable to strategic behaviour or reliance upon the 
anchoring heuristic observed in other repeated response elicitation formats. In a first formal 
test of the method we show that it fails crucial tests of procedural invariance and induces 
strategic behaviour amongst responses.  
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1. Introduction 
More than fifty years ago, Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947, 1952) suggested that “appropriately 
constructed interviews” are capable of obtaining information about people’s preferences for 
goods not ordinarily priced in the market. Since then the contingent valuation (CV) method 
has become the most widely used approach to obtain willingness-to-pay (WTP) values for an 
assortment of environmental and other non-market public goods (Carson, forthcoming). 
However, the issue of how WTP questions should be phrased and responses elicited has been 
and remains one of the most consistent themes in CV research (Cummings et al., 1986; 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 1993; Bateman et al., 2002).  
 
An ideal WTP elicitation method would have three defining characteristics: (i) incentive 
compatibility; (ii) statistical efficiency; and (iii) procedural invariance. Although all three 
criteria are important, it was the issue of incentive compatibility which dominated the 
landmark NOAA ‘Blue-Ribbon Panel’ report on CV (Arrow et al., 1993) and guided its 
endorsement of the ‘single bound’ (SB) dichotomous choice elicitation technique. Under the 
SB approach each survey respondent is presented with a single question asking whether or 
not they are willing to pay a specified sum (often referred to as the bid amount), $X, for the 
good in question. The sum $X is varied across respondents allowing the analyst to estimate 
decision-relevant characteristics of the WTP distribution. Strategic behaviour arguments 
suggest that the dichotomous nature of SB responses makes the approach incentive 
compatible (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). However, compared to other elicitation 
methods, it is statistically inefficient, only determining whether a respondent’s WTP lies 
above or below the bid amount offered to them.  
 
Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen (1991) propose a solution to the inefficiency of the SB 
format in the form of their ‘double-bound’ (DB) elicitation method. Here, following an initial 
dichotomous choice question and response, a supplementary ‘follow-up’ question is added to 
further probe the respondents’ WTP. The elicitation of a second dichotomous choice response 
yields substantial gains in terms of statistical efficiency1. However, the DB approach fails the 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite criterion for incentive compatibility since the approach undermines the 
crucial face-value interpretation of the bid amount as being the cost of providing the good in 
question. While this is credible in the initial question, it is no longer so in the follow-up 
                                                 
1 These gains may be extended through the addition of multiple bounds (Langford et al., 1996; Scarpa and 
Bateman, 2000). 
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(Alberini et al., 1997; Carson, Groves and Machina, 2000). Indeed, researchers have noted 
that respondents are adversely ‘surprised’ by the unanticipated follow-up question to the 
extent that their first and second bound responses are inconsistent (McFadden, 1994; 
Cameron and Quiggen, 1994; Carson et al., 1994; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Alberini, 
Kanninen and Carson, 1997; Bateman et al. 2001; DeShazo, 2002).  
 
Cooper, Hanemann and Signorello (2002; hereafter CHS) propose the ‘one-and-one-half’ 
bound (OOHB) format “as a means to reduce the potential for response bias on the follow-up 
bid in multiple-bound discrete choice formats […] while maintaining much of the efficiency 
gains of the multiple-bound approach…” (p. 742). The OOHB format initially informs survey 
respondents that the costs of the good in question lie between some lower and higher amount 
(which we shall denote $L and $H respectively). This simultaneous presentation of costs is 
intended to avoid the adverse surprise effects of the unanticipated second question in the DB 
format. In order to elicit responses regarding each of these amounts, CHS employ a prior 
random process to assign respondents to either an ‘ascending’ or ‘descending’ presentation 
sequence. In an ascending sequence (which we shall denote LH), survey respondents are 
initially asked whether they are prepared to pay the lower cost $L for the good. Here a “No” 
response terminates the WTP elicitation process, while a “Yes” response results in the 
respondent being asked the second bound question regarding whether they would pay the 
higher amount $H. Conversely in the descending sequence (which we shall denote HL), the 
first bound question presents the higher amount $H. Here a positive response terminates the 
questioning process while a negative response results in the lower amount $L being presented 
at the second bound.  
 
As CHS demonstrate, this simple but highly innovative format yields much of the gains in 
statistical efficiency afforded by the DB approach without recourse to an unexpected follow-
up question. This marks the OOHB format out as one of the most exciting prospects for the 
elicitation of WTP responses since the introduction of the SB method twenty-five years ago 
(Bishop and Heberlein, 1979). This potential is reflected in the rapid uptake of the method 
which has recently been used (or recommended for future use) in valuations of non-market 
goods for a number of government agencies in locations as diverse as North America, Europe, 
Asia and Africa (Barreiro, et al., 2005; Bateman et al., 20022; Bradford, et al., 2004; Kerr, et 
al., 2004; NCEE and NCER, 2000; Scarpa, 2003; Signorello and Cooper, 2002; Sutton, et al., 
2004).  
                                                 
2 Our recommendations to the UK Department for Transport (Bateman et al., 2002) pre-date the present study.  
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Despite this potential and uptake a problem remains. While the OOHB may avoid the 
surprise associated with the follow-up question of the DB format, its reliance upon two prices 
still sets it at odds with the incentive compatibility requirements of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite 
criterion. This sets the scene for the present study. While CHS assert that they can find “no 
obvious vices” (p. 749) within their application, they acknowledge that their sample size is 
insufficient for rigorous testing (see p746, footnote 8; indeed much of their paper is taken up 
by comparing the OOHB to the heavily criticised DB approach; a comparison which given 
such criticism cannot of itself validate the former method). In contrast, incentive 
compatibility arguments would suggest that the OOHB provides respondents with ample 
opportunity to indulge in strategic behaviour and/or may induce framing anomalies or 
reliance upon the anchoring heuristic (DeShazo, 2002) 
 
The central purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a full and rigorous examination of 
the procedural invariance properties of the OOHB using what is, to our knowledge, the first 
dataset designed and sufficient for such analytical purposes. Through such testing we seek to 
examine whether the incentive compatibility arguments against the OOHB do indeed result in 
anomalous responses, i.e. are theoretical expectations supported. In the following section we 
set out a suite of non-parametric, parametric and welfare measure tests. In summary these 
consistently reject the null hypothesis of procedural invariance within the OOHB, thereby 
supporting the economic-theoretic expectation that the method’s lack of incentive 
compatibility has resulted in either strategic behaviour (as suggested by standard theory) or in 
recourse to some anomalous response heuristic, most obviously anchoring (ibid.). 
Accordingly we extend Section II to define further tests with which to discriminate between 
these competing behavioural models. Section III reports details of the survey instrument 
design and implementation process while Section IV reports our focal analyses of procedural 
invariance and response behaviour. Section IV discusses implications and concludes. 
 
2. Testing for procedural invariance and response behaviour in 
 the OOHB format 
 
As noted above, the central purpose of this paper is to undertake tests of whether theory 
driven concerns regarding the incentive compatibility of the OOHB format result in a failure 
of procedural invariance within the method. In order to formulate such tests it is useful to 
develop some notation. Consider some given bid amount $X. Respondents might encounter 
this bid amount in one of four possible arrangements. It may be the first question in an 
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ascending sequence of questions, in which case we label it $XL1 (treatment LOW 1), or as the 
second question in a descending sequence in which case we label it $XL2 (treatment LOW 2). 
Likewise, if the bid amount is the high value of the pair it is labelled $XH1 when it is the first 
question in the descending sequence (treatment HIGH 1) or as $XH2 when it is the second 
question in the ascending sequence (treatment HIGH 2). Our testable hypotheses concern 
acceptance rates for $X under these four treatments. The probability of a respondent 
accepting a particular bid amount is [ ]YesXP =$  which we label simply as XP . Likewise 
the acceptance rate for $XL1 is labelled 1LXP and the definitions of 2LXP , 1HXP  and 2HXP  
follow accordingly.  
 
We adopt three approaches to procedural invariance testing, as follows:  
(1) Nonparametric tests: comparing the proportion of respondents saying “yes” to a  
 certain price under different treatments3;  
(2) Parametric tests: examining the coefficient estimates from parametric modelling of 
 the WTP distribution under different treatments;  
(3) Tests of mean WTP: comparing estimates of mean WTP derived from models of the 
 WTP distribution under different treatments. 
 
In all cases the null hypothesis of procedural invariance is that there will be no treatment 
effects. Our nonparametric tests formalise this as our first null hypothesis ( 0H ) in Table 1. 
Similarly our subsequent parametric testing examines the hypothesis that scale and location 
parameters for variables describing the four different treatments LOW 1, LOW 2, HIGH 1 
and HIGH 2 can be constrained to be equal. Furthermore, our examination of derived welfare 
measures examines whether each of these treatments yield estimates of mean WTP which are 
                                                 
3 For example, we test whether the proportion of subjects (drawn from independent samples) responding “yes” 
to a price of $100 does not differ whether that price is offered as the first or second price in a OOHB question 
(tested via Pearson’s chi-squared test for independent samples). We assume only that a respondent who refuses 
to pay some lower initial price (say $50) is implicitly indicating that they will respond “no” to the follow-up 
price of $100. Accordingly, under the null, the “no” response proportion for the sample facing $100 as a follow-
up price can be calculated as the ratio of the sum of actual and implied “no” responses to the sample size. 
Likewise, under the null, the “yes” response proportion can be taken as the ratio of the actual “yes” responses to 
the sample size. Marginal probabilities calculated in this way are equally valid irrespective of whether the price 
of interest (here $100) is presented as either the first or second price in the OOHB format. We contend that this 
approach provides the most straightforward and unequivocal nonparametric testing. However, by contrast, CHS 
choose only to examine the responses of those that actually respond to the $100 price. Of course, only those 
with a WTP in excess of $50 get to actually respond to the $100 bid as a follow-up price. Accordingly, CHS 
observe that under the null, the proportion of actual “yes” responses to $100 as a follow-up price to $50 should 
exceed the proportion of actual “yes” responses to $100 as an initial price. The test employed by CHS, therefore, 
differs from our test in comparing a conditional probability to a marginal probability, rather than comparing two 
marginal probabilities. Interestingly CHS report that “in most instances” (p746, footnote 8) they observe that the 
marginal probability exceeds the conditional probability, i.e. procedural invariance is not supported. However, 
CHS note that their sample size was insufficient to undertake adequate tests of the significance of these findings. 
5 
not statistically different. These three forms of testing are advocated by CHS. However, as 
noted previously, CHS acknowledge that sample size restrictions constrain them from 
undertaking adequate nonparametric testing, while their parametric tests and examinations of 
welfare measures principally focus upon the impacts of changing functional form and 
comparisons between the OOHB and DB approach (which, as indicated above, is of lesser 
interest to us given well-founded theoretical and empirical criticism of the DB method), 
neither of which provide clear tests of the procedural invariance of the OOHB4.  
 
As discussed in detail in the subsequent section, all three forms of testing clearly reject 
procedural invariance in the OOHB method. This confirms the economic-theoretic prediction 
that the incentive compatibility deficiencies of the method result in some variant of strategic 
and/or anomalous behaviour. We therefore consider a number of further tests examining the 
nature of this behaviour. In constructing these tests we draw upon existing literature 
regarding repeated response CV formats and in particular that regarding procedural 
invariance in the DB method. Of particular relevance is the work of DeShazo (2002), who 
advances a “framing” hypothesis and an “anchoring” hypothesis as alternative behavioural 
models that might induce apparently anomalous responses to DB WTP questions, and Carson, 
Groves and Machina (2000), who discuss the various strategic behaviour responses to CV 
elicitation formats which fail tests of incentive compatibility. 
 
The framing model derives from prospect theory and reference-dependent utility theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Bateman et al., 1997, 2005). 
Key to DeShazo’s framing model is the assertion that in accepting an offered price, 
respondents assume that an informal exchange has been concluded. As a result, a respondent 
answering “Yes” to the first bid amount forms a ‘reference point’ that includes the surplus 
that they expect to enjoy from the exchange made at that price. From this reference point, the 
subsequent (and perhaps unexpected) presentation of a higher price is regarded by the 
respondent as precipitating a loss in surplus. DeShazo argues that this negative framing will 
tend to bias down the rate of acceptance of a bid level when presented as the second (and 
higher) price in an ascending sequence of questions. In contrast, a respondent answering 
                                                 
4 CHS do report one test in their footnote 13 (p.748) where responses to a SB question format (actually the first 
question of a DB format, though from the point of view of the subject these are identical) are compared with 
responses to the first question of an OOHB question format. Their test rejects the null hypothesis that 
parameters are drawn from the same distribution raising questions regarding the procedural invariance of CHS’s 
own dataset (likelihood ratio test score of 52.76 compared to a critical test score of 9.49 at the 95% confidence 
level). However, further parametric testing of procedural invariance is not undertaken, tests instead focussing on 
functional form and OOHB versus DB issues.  
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“No” to the first bid amount effectively refuses the trade when offered at that price. In this 
case, no new reference point is formed, such that the second (and lower) price offered in the 
follow-up question is neither negatively, nor positively framed. This account also conforms 
with a strategic behaviour model derived from standard theory. However, the empirical 
manifestations of these accounts are identical and cannot be distinguished as both predict a 
lowering of acceptance rates for bid amounts under the HIGH 2 treatment. This prediction is 
presented in the second row of Table 1 as our first alternative hypothesis ( 1AH ).  
 
The anchoring model opines that respondents, uncertain of their own valuation of the good 
being offered them, may interpret the initial bid level as an amount that provides information 
on the good’s ‘true’ value. As such, the first bid amount is assumed to act as an anchor 
towards which respondents adjust their valuation. In particular, respondents are assumed to 
update their valuation of the good to some amount between their original (and uncertain) 
valuation and the initial bid amount (DeShazo, 2002, Herriges and Shogren, 1996). Clearly, 
the behaviour hypothesized by this model should not affect a respondent’s decision as to 
whether to accept or refuse the good offered at the initial bid price. The same is not true of 
decisions concerning the follow-up question. Having moved their valuation in the direction of 
the initial bid amount, respondents will be more likely to refuse a follow-up question offering 
the good at a higher price. Likewise, they will be more likely to accept a follow-up question 
offering the good at a lower price. DeShazo’s anchoring model again predicts a lowering of 
acceptance rates for bid amounts under the HIGH 2 treatment while additionally anticipating 
inflated acceptance rates for the LOW 2 treatment. This is our second alternative hypothesis 
( 2AH ) in which second responses are purely anchored to initial bids and has no strategic 
behaviour equivalent. In his investigation DeShazo finds empirical evidence in DB data that 
supports the framing model in favour of the null hypothesis and the anchoring hypothesis, 
though he states that “the anchoring hypothesis raises the most difficulties and most deserves 
further study” (p. 372). 
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Table 1 
Predicted relationships between acceptance rates for bid amounts under 
different hypotheses 
Predicted Relationships between Acceptance 
Rates by Treatment Hypothesis 
LOW 2  LOW 1  HIGH 1  HIGH 2 
0H :  CHS 
            (procedural invariance) 
2LXP  = 1LXP  = 1HXP  = 2HXP  
1AH :  Framing 2LXP  = 1LXP  = 1HXP  > 2HXP  
2AH :  Pure Anchoring  
 (on initial bid only) 
2LXP  > 1LXP  = 1HXP  > 2HXP  
3AH :  Symmetric Anchoring  
 (on both bids) 
2LXP  = 1LXP  > 1HXP  = 2HXP  
4AH :  Asymmetric Anchoring  
 (on both bids) 
2LXP  > 1LXP  > 1HXP  > 2HXP  
 
 
Of course, the DB and OOHB formats differ fundamentally in the way in which the bid levels 
are revealed to the respondent. In particular, under the OOHB format respondents are made 
aware of both high and low bid levels in advance of the valuation questions. As such, 
anchoring, as envisaged by DeShazo for the DB format, may not carry over to the OOHB 
format. Given that respondents in the OOHB format are aware of both a high and a low price 
of provision for the good, it may well be that they do not anchor solely on the first bid 
amount presented to them. Rather, they may take both pieces of information into account, 
anchoring on a value somewhere in the range between the high and low bid values.  
 
If we suppose that respondents weight both pieces of information equally then a respondent 
will form the same anchor independent of the order in which the two prices are presented. We 
refer to such behaviour, which is based upon literature from the heuristics field of cognitive 
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psychology (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), as “symmetric anchoring”. Such behaviour will 
act so as to increase acceptance rates for low bid amounts and decrease acceptance rates for 
high bid amounts. However, symmetric anchoring implies that responses to the low (high) 
bid amount will be the same whether this amount is presented first or second. We formalize 
the predictions of the symmetric anchoring model within our third alternative hypothesis 
( 3AH ).  
 
Alternatively, we might suppose that respondents take account of both pieces of information 
($L and $H) but give added weight to the bid amount they are asked to consider first. This 
seems a reasonable formalisation of a variant of strategic behaviour in which the ordering of 
bids conveys information to the respondent; in this case the information being that the 
amount presented first is more likely to represent the real cost of the programme than is the 
amount presented second. We refer to such economic-theoretic strategic behaviour as 
“asymmetric anchoring”. In this case, the anchoring point will differ according to the order in 
which the pair of bids is presented. In particular, not only will acceptance rates be deflated for 
high bid amounts and inflated for low bid amounts, but also these effects will be more 
pronounced when bids are presented as the second in the pair of WTP questions. The 
predictions of the asymmetric anchoring model make up our fourth alternative hypothesis 
( 4AH ). Comparisons of 3AH  and 4AH  respectively provide an insight into whether non-
standard or standard strategic behaviour explanations are best supported by our data. 
 
Moreover, we feel it is important to test a second null hypothesis concerning the strength of 
effects. Put simply, we might expect that the magnitude of any effect may be related to the 
difference between the high and low bids. Certainly, such an observation would be consistent 
with the symmetric and asymmetric anchoring models. To illustrate, imagine a particular bid 
amount presented to a respondent as the low amount in a pair of questions. As usual we shall 
label this LX$ . Imagine also that the other question in the pair presents the bid amount 
*$H . 
Now according to both the symmetric and asymmetric anchoring models, respondents use 
some rule to calculate a value in the range between LX$  and 
*$H  on which they anchor. 
Respondents tend to adjust their valuation of the good towards this anchor and in so doing 
inflate the acceptance rate for LX$ . Now imagine that LX$  had been paired with 
**$H , an 
amount higher than *$H . Provided respondents apply the same rule, then we would imagine 
that their anchoring point for the ( LX$ , 
**$H ) pair would be higher than for the ( LX$ , 
*$H ) 
pair. As such, the acceptance rate for LX$  when paired with 
**$H  should be somewhat 
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greater than when it is paired with *$H . The inverse argument can be made with regards to a 
high bid amount, HX$  paired with the two different low bid values 
*$L  or **$L  (where 
*** $$ LL < ). 
 
Again we can formalize these predictions into testable hypotheses. First we denote the 
acceptance rate for LX$  as *| HX L
P  when it is paired with *$H , and as **| HX L
P  when it is 
paired with **$H . The definitions of *| LX H
P  and **| LX H
P  follow accordingly. Moreover, it is 
always the case that *** $$ HH <  and *** $$ LL < . Using this notation, the first row of Table 
2 describes a second null hypothesis ( 0H ′ ) in which there is procedural invariance in 
acceptance rates. The alternative hypothesis ( AH ′ ), in which the magnitude of the difference 
between the high and low bid amounts affects acceptance rates, is defined by the predictions 
in the second row of Table 2.  
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Table 2 
Predicted relationships concerning the strength of framing or anchoring effects under 
different hypotheses 
Predicted Relationships between Conditional 
Acceptance Rates Hypothesis 
( *** $$ HH <  and *** $$ LL < ) 
0H ′ :  CHS 
            (procedural invariance) 
*** || HXHX LL
PP =  and  *** || LXLX HH PP =  
AH ′ :  Procedural Variance  
 (e.g. pure anchoring)  
*** || HXHX LL
PP <  and  *** || LXLX HH PP <  
3AH ′ :  Symmetric Anchoring  
 (on both bids) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − ****** |2|2|1|1 HXHXHXHX LLLL PPPP  
and  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − ****** |2|2|1|1 LXLXLXLX HHHH PPPP  
4AH ′ :  Asymmetric Anchoring  
 (on both bids) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − ****** |2|2|1|1 HXHXHXHX LLLL PPPP  
and  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − ****** |2|2|1|1 LXLXLXLX HHHH PPPP  
 
 
The symmetric and asymmetric anchoring hypotheses imply different predictions concerning 
the influence of question order on the strength of anchoring effects. In particular, symmetric 
anchoring implies that the rule by which respondents form their anchoring point is to choose 
the midpoint between the high and low bids. Consequently, the strength of the anchoring 
effect in this case, should not be influenced by the order in which the high and low bid are 
presented. This hypothesis is formalized in the two predictions making up hypothesis 3AH ′  
(row three of Table 2). In contrast, the asymmetric anchoring model implies that the rule used 
by respondents is to form their anchoring point in the range between the high and low bids 
but favouring the bid that is presented to them first. In this case, the order of presentation is 
taken as conveying information and hence will matter in determining the strength of the 
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anchoring effect. In particular, the strength of the effect will be diminished for bid amounts 
presented first in the pair of OOHB questions, but will be exaggerated for bid amounts 
forming the second of the pair. The predictions for this hypothesis are given by 4AH ′  in the 
final row of Table 2. As before symmetric anchoring supports a psychologically based 
expectation whereas asymmetric anchoring is a consequence of strategic behaviour. 
 
3. Survey instrument design and implementation process 
While CHS choose to test the OOHB on a private good, the method is clearly intended for 
use within the more usual CV domain of non-market public good valuation. Our empirical 
case study accordingly focuses upon such a good; the remediation of phosphate induced 
eutrophication problems affecting nearby rivers and lakes. Such water environment 
improvements have been a consistent focus of CV research (Desvousges et al., 1987; Sanders 
et al., 1990; Carson and Mitchell, 1993; Whittington et al., 1994; Goffe, 1995; Day and 
Mourato, 1998; Georgiou et al., 1998, 2000; Eisen-Hecht and Kramer, 2002) and so provide 
an ideal testing ground for our study.  
 
The survey questionnaire was designed in accordance with best practice guidelines (Mitchell 
and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 1993; Bateman et al., 2002) and is available from the authors. 
Extensive use was made of focus groups to refine the description of the good and formulate 
an appropriate contingent market which was conveyed using a combination of clear and 
concise text augmented by visual aids. The resultant survey instrument was tested through a 
pilot survey of some 100 households after which the final survey questionnaire was refined. 
Both focus group and pilot exercises were also used to define an appropriate vector of bid 
amounts across which a range of positive and negative responses might be expected. 
 
The survey questionnaire presented respondents with information regarding the nature of the 
eutrophication problem and details of a proposal to address this issue through the installation 
of new technology at sewage works so as to remove phosphates from household sewage. 
Survey respondents were informed that the implementation of such an environmental 
improvement programme would increase their annual household water bill. This payment 
vehicle is attractive from a CV perspective as it is effectively universal and unavoidable 
thereby avoiding the problems associated with discretionary payment vehicles (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989).  
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Survey respondents were informed in advance that the cost to their household of the 
phosphate removal scheme was between a specified lower and upper bound ($L and $H 
respectively). An unseen random process was used to allocate respondents to one of thirteen 
pairs of amounts. Of these, seven described ascending sequences as follows: £10-£50; £25-
£100; £50-£100; £75-£100; £100-£150; £100-£200; £48.50-£98.505; these pairings being 
labelled LH1 to LH7 respectively. The remaining six pairs described descending sequences 
as follows: £50-£10; £100-£25; £100-£50; £100-£75; £150-£100; and £200-£100 (labelled 
HL1 to HL6 respectively). These pairs were chosen upon two criteria: first that they all fell 
within the distribution of bids implied by our focus group and pilot survey investigations; 
second, that they permitted ready and unambiguous testing of our hypotheses. In particular 
the repetition of certain bid amounts, such as the £100 bid, across a variety of contexts assists 
simple non-parametric testing of hypotheses.  
 
The data were collected using a face-to-face interviewing techniques applied to a sample of 
randomly selected households in and around the city of Norwich, England. Surveying was 
conducted during a five week period in the summer of 2003. In total 1254 households 
provided completed questionnaires6.  
 
4. Data and analyses of procedural invariance and response 
 behaviour 
 
Table 3 reports the resulting acceptance rates for each bid level from each of the thirteen bid 
pairings describing our various ascending and descending sequences.  
                                                 
5 Note that the £48.50-£98.50 pair was only used in the ascending sequence to provide a side analysis 
comparison with the £50-£100 pair examining whether the implied greater accuracy of the former pair resulted 
in any significant impact upon acceptance rates. A comparison of acceptance rates for the LH bid pairs (£48.50, 
£98.50) and (£50, £100) in Table 3 reveals no clear evidence that use of the former ‘more accurate’ pair results 
in any substantial impact upon acceptance rates. 
6 A further 1067 households were approached but declined to take part in the survey giving a response rate of 
54%. The most common reasons for refusing to take part were time constraints and a lack of interest in any 
survey (respondents were unaware of the subject matter of the study at the outset of the survey). Arguably this 
may mean sample values might differ from those held across the population. This is a common problem for 
survey research and is not the focus of the present study, being discussed in Bateman et al., (forthcoming).  
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Table 3 
Comparison of bid acceptance rates across treatments† 
Ascending Sequence (LH) Descending Sequence (HL) 
 LOW 1 HIGH 2   HIGH 1 LOW 2  
 First bound Second bound   First bound Second bound  
Label Initial 
(Lower) 
bid 
amount 
($L) 
Acceptance 
rate for $L 
(%) 
Follow-up 
(Higher) 
bid 
amount 
($H) 
Acceptance 
rate for 
$H†† (%) 
Absolute 
difference 
 ($H - $L) 
Label Initial 
(Higher) 
bid 
amount 
($H) 
Acceptance 
rate for $H
(%) 
Follow-up 
(Lower) 
bid 
amount 
($L) 
Acceptance 
rate for 
$L†† (%) 
Absolute 
difference 
($H - $L) 
LH1 10 90.1% 50 46.5% 40 HL1 50 59.4% 10 90.1% 40 
LH2 50 55.7% 100 23.7% 50 HL2 100 36.6% 50 65.6% 50 
LH3 100 42.1% 150 26.3% 50 HL3 150 38.9% 100 48.4% 50 
LH4 100 46.9% 200 9.2% 100 HL4 200 28.1% 100 61.5% 100 
LH5 25 82.1% 100 22.1% 75 HL5 100 30.5% 25 85.3% 75 
LH6 75 41.6% 100 32.7% 25 HL6 100 31.1% 75 42.2% 25 
LH7 48.50 52.6% 98.50 18.6% 50       
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Given that the central issue of this paper is to undertake procedural invariance testing of the 
OOHB format, we will begin our presentation of results by presenting first parametric, then 
welfare measure analyses, followed by nonparametric testing of this issue. These tests 
conclusively reject the null of procedural invariance and we consequently extend our 
nonparametric analysis through the various hypotheses of Tables 1 and 2 to examine the 
origin of problems with the OOHB approach.    
 
In undertaking parametric tests of procedural invariance in the OOHB format we follow the 
established bivariate parametric testing framework of Cameron and Quiggin (1994). We 
allowed the location parameter of the estimated WTP distributions to be functions of the 
socioeconomic characteristics of respondents to assure ourselves that differences in the 
estimated distributions are not being driven by random differences in the characteristics of 
our subsamples7. More fundamentally we specified our unconstrained model to incorporate 
two crucial aspects necessary to appropriate testing of procedural invariance.  First, we 
allowed both the location parameter and the scale parameter of the WTP distributions to 
differ across the four treatments (i.e. LOW 1, HIGH 2, HIGH 1, LOW 2). Second, we 
allowed for non-perfect correlation in the responses of subjects to the first and second 
question8. The parameter estimates for this unconstrained model are reported in Table 4. We 
found that allowing each treatment to have a different WTP distribution results in an estimate 
for the correlation in subjects’ responses that is almost identically one.   
                                                 
7 In this case the variables INCOME (respondents household income), AGE (respondents age), FEMALE (=1 if 
respondent is female; zero otherwise) and VISITOR (frequency of use of the non-market good being valued). 
Other variables in our parametric models are the natural logarithm of the bid level (Ln PRICE) and, for models 
of second bound responses, the absolute difference between the first and second bid amount (ABS DIFF FROM 
1st PRICE). 
8 In contrast CHS assume that subjects’ implied WTP is perfectly correlated across the two questions, thus 
making it impossible to perform the Cameron and Quiggin procedural invariance tests. Moreover, CHS do not 
compare estimated parameters across different models to test the null hypothesis that the distribution of WTP 
values is invariant as to whether that distribution is estimated from the first price data, second price data or some 
combination of the two. Furthermore, although CHS themselves do state (p.748) that the appropriate range for 
WTP in their data is only over non-negative values, they model WTP using a univariate logistic distribution, 
which allows for negative values. All of the models reported in the present paper conform with economic theory 
by estimating WTP distributions that are only defined for non-negative values. 
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Table 4 
Fully Unconstrained Model: WTP distributions allowed to differ for first and second 
bids and for high and low bids; LOW1 ≠ LOW2 ≠ HIGH1 ≠ HIGH2 for location and 
scale parameters 
Variable Coefficients Std. Err. 
Equation 1: Responses to First Question: 
Respondents receiving low bids: 
Ln PRICE -0.7368  0.0721*** 
INCOME 0.0205 0.0037*** 
AGE 0.0008 0.0029 
FEMALE -0.1205 0.1089 
VISITOR 0.0006 0.0006 
CONSTANT 2.6446 0.3247*** 
Respondents receiving high bids: 
Ln PRICE 0.1651  0.0677** 
INCOME -0.0130  0.0055** 
AGE -0.0052  0.0043 
FEMALE -.2635  0.1598* 
VISITOR 0.0000  0.0010 
ABS DIFF FROM 1st PRICE -0.0051  0.0023** 
Equation 2: Responses to Second Question: 
Respondents receiving low bids: 
Ln PRICE -0.7023  0.0796*** 
INCOME 0.0154  0.0037*** 
AGE -0.0045 0.0031 
FEMALE 0.1084  0.1142 
VISITOR 0.0021  0.0006*** 
CONSTANT 3.2306 0.3592*** 
Respondents receiving high bids: 
Ln PRICE -0.0850 0.0707 
INCOME -0.0033  0.0057 
AGE -0.0026  0.0046 
FEMALE 0.0488  0.1691 
VISITOR -0.0019  0.0010* 
ABS DIFF FROM 1st PRICE -0.0850  0.0707 
ρ 1.0000 0.0000*** 
Log likelihood -1057.234  
Confidence levels are: *** 99% ; ** 95% ; * 90%    
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In contrast, our fully constrained model imposed the same distribution of WTP on each of the 
four treatments. The parameter estimates for the fully constrained model are reproduced in 
Table 5. In this model, the correlation in subjects responses is only 0.43 which is significantly 
different from 1 (p-value < 0.001). Clearly, if this model were supported by the data (which it 
is not), then the implication would be that subjects’ use different WTP values in responding 
to the first and second question. However, a likelihood ratio test comparing the fully 
constrained model to the unconstrained model confirmed that we can categorically reject the 
hypothesis of identical WTP distributions (test ratio = 69.85, critical value at 95% confidence 
= 28.90, p-value < 0.01).  
Table 5 
Fully Constrained Model: WTP distributions constrained to be identical: LOW1 = 
LOW2 = HIGH1 = HIGH2 for location and scale parameters 
Variable Coefficients  Std. Err. 
Ln PRICE -0.7783 0.0584*** 
INCOME 0.0133 0.0024*** 
AGE -0.0040 0.0019** 
FEMALE 0.0652 0.0680 
VISITOR 0.0009 0.0004** 
CONSTANT 3.0917 0.2777*** 
ρ 0.4263 0.1134*** 
Log likelihood -1092.157  
Confidence levels are: *** 99% ; ** 95% ; * 90%   
 
Accordingly, we experimented to see which restrictions might be imposed across 
distributions and which must be rejected. We present our final parametric model in Table 6. 
Here, we found that we could not reject the possibility that the WTP distributions for all four 
treatments have identical scale parameters. Likewise, we could not reject the possibility that 
the marginal impacts of subjects’ socioeconomic characteristics on the location parameters of 
the WTP distributions are identical across all four treatments. Moreover, our final model 
indicated that the WTP distributions in response to the first question are effectively the same  
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regardless of whether subjects face the high or low price (LOW 1 = HIGH 1). However, 
compared to the WTP distribution for the first question, there is a significant upward shift in 
the implied WTP distribution for those facing a low price as the second question (LOW 2). 
Moreover, in contrast to the LOW 2 WTP distribution, those facing a high price as the second 
question (HIGH 2) tend to express significantly lower WTP, and the degree of shift is 
determined by the absolute difference between this bid and the low bid they received in the 
first question.  
Table 6 
Preferred Model: WTP distributions have fully constrained scale parameters (LOW1 = 
LOW2 = HIGH1 = HIGH2) and equal covariate effects whilst location parameters are 
held equal for first price responses but allowed to differ for second price responses 
((LOW1 = HIGH1) ≠ LOW2 ≠ HIGH2) 
Variable Coefficients Std. Err. 
Equation 1: Responses to First Question: 
    CONSTANT  2.8975 0.2509*** 
Equation 2: Responses to Second Question:  
    CONSTANT 3.1106 0.2371*** 
    ABS DIFF FROM 1st PRICE -0.0109 0.0015*** 
Common coefficients constrained to be same for both equations: 
    Ln PRICE -0.7312 0.0504*** 
    INCOME 0.0142 0.0025*** 
    AGE -0.0034 0.0020* 
    FEMALE 0.0470 0.0711 
    VISITOR 0.0009 0.0004** 
ρ 0.9991 27.9580 
Log likelihood -1068.895 -1068.895 
Confidence levels are: *** 99% ; ** 95% ; * 90%    
 
 18 
To confirm that this is the best fitting model we carried out a likelihood ratio test that 
compared this constrained model with the fully unconstrained model. This test confirmed that 
we could not reject the restrictions imposed on the preferred model (test ratio = 23.32, critical 
value at 95% confidence = 26.30, p-value = 0.11). Moreover, imposing any further 
restrictions on the preferred model resulted in that model being significantly different from 
the unconstrained model. We also carried out a likelihood ratio test which confirmed that the 
preferred model differs significantly from the fully constrained model (test ratio = 46.52, 
critical value at 95% confidence = 5.99, p-value < 0.01). In summary then, our parametric 
testing rejects the null hypothesis of procedural invariance in the OOHB format.  
 
Turning to consider tests of welfare measures, comparisons were made between estimates of 
mean WTP using the following data; 
(1) Responses to the first bid level.  
(2) Responses to the second bid level.  
(3) Responses to both first and second bid levels.  
(4) Responses to the first bid level and the second bid level when this represents an 
 ascending sequence.  
(5) Responses to the first bid level and the second bid level when this represents a 
 descending sequence.  
 
Distribution functions in for each of these five cases were constructed using nonparametric 
maximum likelihood (NPML) estimates of the distribution function. This method for 
constructing the nonparametric distribution function is similar to the linear interpolation 
method described in Boman et al. (1999). The NPML estimator identifies intervals, known as 
equivalence classes, within which the probability distribution may, but not necessarily does, 
attribute probability mass (see Day, 2005). Here we assume that this probability mass is 
uniformly distributed across equivalence classes. Furthermore we truncate the distribution at 
the highest bid amount offered to respondents. Estimates of mean WTP are calculated as the 
area under the survivor function of this probability distribution function. Column 2 of Table 7 
presents estimates of mean WTP from the 5 cases along with bootstrapped confidence 
intervals. 
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Table 7 
Estimates of mean WTP derived from combining responses to different bounds of the 
OOHB format. 
Case 
Mean WTP 
(95% Confidence 
Interval) 
Probability that this is 
equal to 1st bids Mean 
(1) 1st bids 
96.98 
(90.72 to 101.90) 
 
(2) 2nd Bids 
86.09 
(79.64 to 92.12) 
<0.001 
(3) 1st and 2nd Bids 
88.47 
(84.17 to 92.74) 
0.002 
(4) 1st Bids and Ascending 2nd Bids 
87.06 
(82.53 to 91.58) 
<0.001 
(5) 1st Bids and Descending 2nd Bids 
96.11 
(90.83 to 100.79) 
.701 
 
 
We wish to compare estimates of mean WTP from cases 2 to 5 with the base case. To do this 
we use a simple bootstrap procedure. Our null hypothesis is that mean WTP estimated from 
1st bids only is an unbiased estimator of the population WTP. Let us call this estimate stx1 . 
We draw 1000 bootstrap samples from the data and, for each sample, estimate mean WTP 
based on responses to 1st bids. We subtract stx1  from each bootstrap estimate and square the 
results. The bootstrap procedure, therefore, provides an estimate of the sampling distribution 
of squared deviations from mean WTP under the null. To test whether responses to the 2nd 
bid result in an estimate of WTP that differs significantly from that from the 1st bid, we first 
subtract stx1  from the estimate of mean WTP based on responses to 2nd bids and square the 
result. This statistic can then be compared to the distribution of squared deviations under the 
null to ascertain the likelihood of observing such a difference by chance.  
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The same procedure was repeated for each of the cases and the results presented in Column 3 
of Table 7. These can be read as describing the probability of a difference in means of the 
observed size or more occurring purely by chance. For example, we can say that there is less 
than 0.1% chance of observing a mean value that differs from stx1  by as much as that 
calculated from responses to the 2nd bids. In contrast, there is a 70.1% chance of observing a 
mean value that differs from stx1  by as much as that calculated from responses to 1st bids and 
descending 2nd bids. 
 
The analysis again rejects the hypothesis of procedural invariance in the OOHB format. It 
appears that estimates of mean WTP derived using just 1st bids are significantly larger than 
those estimated using just 2nd bids and, for that matter, significantly larger than those that use 
both 1st and 2nd bid information. The analysis also gives some insight into what is driving 
these differences. It seems that the main bias is to be found in data pertaining to responses to 
2nd bids in an ascending sequence. This conforms to the asymmetric anchoring pattern 
symptomatic of strategic behaviour.  
 
Our final and arguably most informative set of analyses are provided by the nonparametric 
tests described in Tables 1 and 2. Recall that Table 1 states our null hypothesis of procedural 
invariance ( 0H ): states that acceptance rates should be invariant to treatment. However, even 
a visual inspection of the raw acceptance rates reported in Table 3 strongly suggests that we 
should reject this null. For example, acceptance rates for the £100 bid level under the LOW 2 
treatment reach as high as 61.5% compared with a low of 22.1% under the HIGH 2 treatment.   
 
In total our experimental design allows for 48 pairwise comparisons of response proportions 
where the same price is presented to separate subsamples under different treatments. To 
ensure the robustness of nonparametric testing, each subsample had between 90 and 106 
subjects. With the exception of just 4 of these 48 comparisons, the response proportions 
satisfy the asymmetric anchoring ( 4AH ) pattern of strategic behaviour namely that 2LXP  > 
1LXP  > 1HXP  > 2HXP . Furthermore, 23 of these differences are statistically significant
9 with 
the pattern of significance being detailed in Table 8. As can be seen, the consistency of 
significance is lower where solely first bound responses are compared and highest where 
solely second bound responses are compared (note also that this latter case is also where the 
payoffs to strategic behaviour are highest).  
                                                 
9 It should be noted that not all of the tests in Table 8 are independent; the same price might appear more than 
once in any one treatment such that multiple comparisons can be made for a subsample facing that same price 
under a different treatment. 
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Table 8 
Pairwise comparisons of response proportions for same price under different 
treatments in separate subsamples 
Treatments 
Compared 
Number of cases 
Cases following the 
asymmetric 
anchoring pattern 
( 4AH ) 
Responses portions 
are different with 
95% confidence 
(two-tailed test) 
LOW 2 vs. HIGH 2 7 7 7 
LOW 2 vs. HIGH 1 7 7 5 
LOW 1 vs. HIGH 2 7 7 5 
LOW 2 vs. LOW 1 8 7 2 
LOW 1 vs. HIGH 1 7 6 2 
HIGH 1 vs. HIGH 2 12 10 2 
 
 
The findings reported in Table 8 convincingly reject the null of procedural invariance. 
However, they also provide evidence regarding the framing and pure anchoring models as 
formulated by DeShazo for the DB format ( 1AH  and 2AH  in Table 1). These assert that 
responses to the initial bid level are unbiased. As such, acceptance rates for the same bid level 
under treatment LOW 1 should not differ systematically from those under treatment HIGH 1. 
Alternatively, the modified anchoring models that take account of pre-revelation of both high 
and low prices ( 3AH  and 4AH  in Table 1), both predict acceptance rates under the LOW 1 
treatment to exceed those under the HIGH 1 treatment. Indeed, making this comparison for 
the £100 bid level reveals that acceptance rates for the LOW 1 treatment (42.1% and 46.9%) 
do appear to be somewhat higher than they are for the HIGH 1 treatment (30.5%, 31.1% and 
36.6%). In this case, since our alternative hypotheses are directional, we employ a one-tailed 
z-test to compare these differences in proportions. The £50 bid level is also repeated in both 
treatments so that there are seven pairwise comparisons that can be made. Of these we find 
three to be different at the 95% level of confidence, two at the 90% level of confidence and 
the remaining two not to show statistically significant differences. Thus the weight of 
evidence rejects equality of acceptance rates over these two treatments and with it DeShazo’s 
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framing and anchoring hypotheses ( 1AH  and 2AH ). Rather, the data appear to support the 
symmetric and asymmetric anchoring models formulated in hypotheses 3AH  and 4AH . 
 
Finally, to distinguish between the symmetric and asymmetric anchoring models, we 
compare the HIGH 1 treatment with the HIGH 2 treatment and the LOW 1 treatment with the 
LOW 2 treatment. Since these two models are founded on the assumption that responses are 
determined in part by the specific values of the pair of bids presented to a respondent, we 
restrict our testing to comparisons in which the bid pairs are identical but presented in 
different orders. Again we employ one-tailed z-tests of differences in proportions to test our 
directional hypotheses. 
 
There are six suitable comparisons that can be made between the HIGH 1 and HIGH 2 
treatments and a further six for the LOW 1 and LOW 2 treatments. All twelve of these 
comparisons were found to conform with the directional expectations of the asymmetric 
anchoring model. Testing revealed that in two cases differences were significant at the 99% 
confidence level, a further three at the 95% level and two more at the 90% level10.  
 
With regards to our first set of testable hypotheses as described in Table 1, we can conclude 
that our data strongly rejects procedural invariance in the OOHB format. Moreover, the 
pattern of responses is unlike that described by DeShazo for DB data. Rather we find that our 
OOHB data most strongly supports a model of asymmetric anchoring in which respondents 
form an anchor based on both high and low price information but give additional weight to 
the price level to which they are asked to respond first. 
 
Now let us consider the strength of effect hypotheses as described in Table 2. Once again, the 
null hypothesis ( 0H ′ ) is one of procedural invariance; that is, acceptance rates for a particular 
bid amount under a particular treatment are assumed to be unaffected by the value of the 
other bid in the pair. Alternatively, the anchoring models suggest that the magnitude of the 
difference between the pair of bids will have predictable impacts on the rates of acceptance 
for those bid amounts ( AH ′ ). 
 
                                                 
10 Notes that the significance of differences was generally stronger for the HIGH 1 versus HIGH 2 comparisons. 
This may reflect that fact that the highest bid level (£200) can only appear in this comparison set (while the 
lowest bid level of £25 only appears in the LOW 1 versus LOW2 comparison). This may suggest that the degree 
of strategic behaviour (and hence asymmetric anchoring) is positively associated with the absolute level of bids. 
This seems plausible if high bid amounts are perceived as indicators of an authority which is attempting to 
capture the consumer surplus associated with provision of a public good.   
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Our experiment was structured in part so that a single design point, the £100 bid amount, 
would provide a robust basis of our tests of effect strength. So, examining acceptance rates 
for this bid level presented as the second in the pair of WTP questions (i.e. in treatments 
LOW 2 and HIGH 2) provides a ready means of comparing our procedural invariance null 
hypothesis 0H ′  with AH ′ . Within the LOW 2 treatment, acceptance rates for the £100 amount 
are 48.4% when preceded by the £150 bid but increase sharply to 61.5% when preceded by 
the £200 bid. Conversely acceptance rates for the £100 bid amount under the HIGH 2 
treatment fall from 32.7% when paired with £25, to 23.7% when paired with £50, down to 
22.1% when paired with £75. Together these provide four directional hypotheses concerning 
differences in acceptance rates for which we can employ one-tailed z-tests of differences in 
proportions. These show that three of these four differences are significant at a 95% 
confidence level (with one being significant at the 99% level). Given this weight of evidence 
we reject the null hypothesis of procedural invariance in favour of an alternative in which the 
acceptance rate for a bid amount is determined in part by the value of the bid amount with 
which it is paired. 
 
Given this conclusion, we can again extend our analysis to examine whether some variant of 
anchoring or a strategic behaviour model is supported by our data. To undertake this we 
consider the differing predictions made by the symmetric and asymmetric anchoring models. 
As described in hypothesis 3AH ′  in Table 2, the symmetric anchoring model predicts that, for 
a particular bid amount, the strength of the effect will be the same independent of the order in 
which the questions are asked. In contrast, the asymmetric anchoring model predicts that the 
strength of the effect will be less for that particular bid amount when presented as the first 
question in the pair (hypothesis 4AH ′  in Table 2).  
 
The bid design is constructed so as to test these alternative hypotheses using the £100 bid 
amount. In particular, given pairs of bid amounts with £100 as the LOW 1 bid are also 
employed in reverse presentation order with £100 as the LOW 2 bid. Similarly mirrored 
pairings are implemented with £100 as either the HIGH 1 or HIGH 2 bid. Under the LOW 2 
and HIGH 2 treatments (i.e. where the £100 bid amount was presented second) three of the 
four possible comparisons returned statistically significant differences in the direction that 
was to be expected under an anchoring hypothesis. However, making the same set of 
comparisons for the LOW 1 and HIGH 1 treatments (i.e. where the £100 bid amount was 
presented first) we find that none of the four comparisons return statistically significant 
differences (and one even reverses the ordering that would be expected under pure anchoring). 
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It seems that the strength of the anchoring effects is more pronounced for a bid amount 
forming the second of the pair of questions than it is for that bid amount forming the first of 
the pair; a pattern of responses that supports the asymmetric anchoring model ( 4AH ′ ) over the 
symmetric anchoring model ( 3AH ′ ). 
 
In summary, the tests presented in Tables 1 and 2 reject numerous proposed models of 
behaviour (including procedural invariance) but are compatible with a model in which 
respondents anchor their WTP on a value in the range between the high and low bid amounts. 
Furthermore, it appears that responses are influenced by the order of presentation of bid 
amounts. In particular, the data supports the asymmetric anchoring model which is an 
indicator of strategic behaviour. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The OOHB approach is an innovative addition to the armoury of CV elicitation methods. It 
combines the response simplicity of a dichotomous choice approach with substantial 
statistical efficiency gains over the more conventional SB approach. Furthermore it explicitly 
sets out to avoid the adverse ‘surprise’ induced by the unanticipated follow-up question in the 
DB format. However, it still presents respondents with two possible prices for the good on 
offer and as such fails the Gibbard-Satterthwaite conditions for incentive compatibility. 
Standard economic theory would suggest that such a format is likely to induce strategic 
behaviour within responses. Alternatively the dual price approach of the OOHB may lead 
respondents to rely upon anchoring heuristics. Both possibilities suggest that the format will 
fail tests of procedural invariance.  
 
This paper presents the first systematic examination of procedural invariance within the 
OOHB method. Through a series of nonparametric, parametric and welfare measure 
comparisons we consistently reject the null hypothesis of procedural invariance. This is, we 
contend, an important finding given the rapid uptake of the approach within decision analyses 
and applied CV work and its recommendation as a preferred method for future applications.  
We extend our analysis to examine the nature of the effects induced by the method. Our 
findings support a strategic behaviour account of responses (as reflected in our asymmetric 
anchoring model) over reliance upon a pure anchoring heuristic.  
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These findings underline the important role which incentive compatibility can play in the 
valuation of preferences for non-market public goods. However, by the same argument it 
could be that the OOHB approach is less vulnerable to procedural variance problems within a 
real trading private goods environment (which is not dissimilar from that employed within 
the original CHS example) or in an experimental setting within which such conditions can be 
maintained.  
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